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Lawyers, like all citizens, inevitably face conflicts between their responsibility to the law and their moral obligations. Attorneys, however, have a unique range of options for resolving such conflicts. They not only have power and privilege in the legal system that other citizens lack, but they also assume a heightened duty to that system and to the law. As the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states, " [t] o lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude." 1 Civil disobedience has become an accepted method for citizens to resist the authority of the state on moral grounds.
2
By committing civil disobedience 3 and willingly accepting judicial punishment, one can protest the moral content of a law while still respecting the legal duty it imposes. This Comment addresses whether the current rules of professional ethics leave the option of civil disobedience available to attorneys, and asks under what circumstances attorneys may be justified in exercising that option.
Attorney civil disobedience is hardly novel. The man who famously demonstrated the power of civil disobedience to the world, Mohandas Gandhi, was trained in the English common law system and practiced law for more than twenty years. 4 Far from being an obstacle to moral reform, Gandhi's legal training was instrumental in the development of nonviolent resistance to British imperial control of India. Gandhi maintained a very lawyerly respect for the law and the legal system even as he defied it. 5 This Comment explores the extent to which the American bar has accepted Gandhi's example of reform for its own lawyers.
After reviewing the moral and philosophical justifications for civil disobedience in Part I, I will examine the codes of professional ethics 6 and related case law in Part II to determine the position of the organized bar on attorney civil disobedience. This discussion makes clear that, despite the bar's insistence in its official rules that its members obey and respect the law, there is a measure of unofficial tolerance for conscientious noncompliance by lawyers. Unfortunately, it remains uncertain from the application of the ethics rules how far this tolerance goes.
Part III addresses normative arguments for and against permitting lawyers to engage in civil disobedience in light of the legal profession's relationship to law and society. I argue that the main criticisms of attorney civil disobedience overlook key elements of the bar's relationship to the law, to the public, and to the legal system. While lawyers should be cognizant of a heightened responsibility to obey the law, the theoretical and practical arguments in favor of allowing them to commit civil disobedience, under some circumstances, are stronger than those in opposition.
Finally, in Part IV, I will elaborate on the circumstances in which attorney disobedience is justified. I propose to amend the rules of legal ethics to acknowledge explicitly that attorneys should subject the law to some personal moral scrutiny. By recognizing that moral obligations may overcome legal duties, the canons of legal ethics will strengthen an important safeguard against injustice. However, since it is appropriate that attorneys exercise a greater degree of caution than other citizens before committing civil disobedience, the rules should establish clear consequences for justified noncompliance. Currently, attorneys face a high-stakes gamble as to how the bar's disciplinary bodies will respond to their disobedience. Leaving their careers to the whims of the profession's disciplinary discretion makes the cost of attorney civil disobedience too high. Yet, imposing some professional consequences on attorneys is appropriate because it will make them evaluate more rigorously the principle for which they are willing to break the law and consider the social costs of their disobedience.
I. THE PURPOSES OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The concept of justified civil disobedience has deep roots in our jurisprudence and has survived challenges to its philosophical foundations. 7 Traditional natural law theory, which has influenced Western legal tradition for centuries, 8 posits a necessary connection between law and morality. 9 Best illustrated by St. Augustine's proposition that "an unjust law is no law at all," 10 natural law theory claims that a law INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 12-14 (rev. ed. 1990 ) (describing the development of natural law theory by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Thomas Aquinas, as well as its reformulation by the thinkers of the Enlightenment and the French and American Revolutions). 9 See id. at 11 ("Natural law theories maintain that there is an essential (conceptual, logical, necessary) connection between law and morality. . . . [A] ccording to natural law theory, it is part of the very meaning of 'law' that it passes a moral test."); see also LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 184 (2001) (describing the natural law proposition that "law must be essentially connected with morality"). 10 AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 8 (Thomas Williams trans., Hackett lacking moral legitimacy is not legally valid. 11 Legal positivism, which grew out of the Enlightenment in reaction to natural law theory, 12 severed the essential link between law and morality. 13 Whereas natural law theory understands legal validity as a normative category, positivism treats it as a purely descriptive one. Positivists look to a law's pedigree-not its moral content-to determine its legal legitimacy.
14 Valid laws are those issued by the sovereign in accordance with the "rule of recognition" of the legal system. 15 They impose an obligation on citizens to obey, and they become a standard within the society for criticizing and justifying behavior. 16 It was against the background of the debate between natural law and positivism that Henry David Thoreau, the "father" of modern-day civil disobedience, 17 developed his understanding of one's right to break the law. Thoreau accepted the positivist perspective that morally repugnant laws were still legally binding, but claimed that his group/King/popular_requests/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2004) .
11 ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 9, at 187 (characterizing the natural law perspective that laws "can be normative in the way they claim only if they are consistent with moral norms"). 12 LAW 185-86 (2d ed. 1994 ) (defining positivism as "the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality"). 14 See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 22 (noting Austin's argument that under positivism "the legal is distinguished from the nonlegal in terms of pedigree," not morality). 15 See HART, supra note 13, at 100 ("Wherever such a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and officials are provided with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation."); cf. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 6-11 (Robert Campbell ed., Jersey City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1875) (arguing that laws are commands by the sovereign backed by threat of force, not moral authority). 16 See HART, supra note 13, at 55-56 (noting that a law, unlike a custom or habit, becomes a measure for criticizing behavior and a justification for demanding certain actions). 17 Cowen, supra note 2, at 588 n.6; Kenneth Jost, Opinion, Oliver North and the Son of Sam, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 4, 1991, at 18. moral obligations could nevertheless outweigh his duty to obey the law. 18 Arguing that even a just government authorized by "the sanction and consent of the governed" had "no pure right over [his] person and property," 19 Thoreau chose to withhold his taxes and accept imprisonment rather than fund the government's support for slavery and its engagement in the Mexican War. 20 Thus was born the modern concept of civil disobedience, under which " [p] ersons are thought to be justified in violating the law if, but only if, they are prepared to be punished for their disobedience." 21 Positivism remains, by and large, the dominant American approach toward legal ethics today. 22 Nevertheless, the history of the twentieth century strongly impressed upon Western culture the tragic potential of obeying laws merely because they are legally valid. We fear what William Simon described as the "nightmarish slippery slope of Positivism" that "leads to compliance with jurisdictionally adequate but morally evil laws like the Nazi enactments requiring reporting Jews and dissidents or the antebellum Fugitive Slave Laws." 23 v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 435 (9th Cir. 1985 ) (Ferguson, J., concurring) ("Some, like Thoreau, chose to refrain from society's fundamental obligation to pay taxes for the common benefit in order to express their repugnance to a government that fostered slavery."). 21 HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 274-75 (1999) ; see also KING, supra note 10, at 83-84 ("I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law."); Pryor, supra note 2, at 8 (contrasting civil disobedience, in which the individual accepts punishment, with lawbreaking in which an individual seeks to evade punishment 901, 916-17 (1995) (recounting the argument that "the the reality of legal regimes that were so unjust that noncompliance with them became, to some, a moral obligation superceding the legal duty to obey the law.
24
Modern advocates of positivism have recognized the need for some moral inquiry into a citizen's duty to the law, noting that "the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience."
25 Consequently, though mainstream American society rejects classical natural law theory, it also resists a categorical duty to obey valid laws 26 and recognizes civil disobedience as a valid form of protest and a valid democratic check on unjust laws.
27
Though the right of citizens to engage in civil disobedience is widely accepted, it remains highly contested whether attorneys have (or should have) the same right.
28 This is clearly a significant question for our society generally and for lawyers in particular. Attorneys enjoy unique privilege and power within the judicial system; their rights, status, and actions inherently affect our legal environment in ways that those of other citizens do not. Our willingness as a society-and the bar's willingness as a profession-to tolerate attorney noncompliance actions of the German legal community under the Nazis resulted from the modern positivist attempt to maintain the distinction between legal and moral validity").
24 See KING, supra note 10, at 84 (justifying the violation of unjust laws in Nazi illuminate the American attorney's relationship to the law in several ways. First, the acceptability of civil disobedience by lawyers necessarily reflects a judgment about the interests that attorneys represent. Our position on this issue reveals whether we view lawyers purely as agents mediating the respective interests of their clients and the state, or whether we also consider them accountable to society for broader moral interests. Second, since one justification for civil disobedience is that there is a personal right to violate the law out of moral obligation, 29 forbidding attorney noncompliance strips lawyers of a prerogative that has come to be understood as a basic element of citizenship. It is prudent to recognize explicitly whether this sacrifice is one of the collateral effects of the decision to be an attorney.
Third, since lawyers are among the primary actors implementing the state's edicts, their capacity to disobey unjust or evil laws is particularly relevant to our concern about the slippery slope of positivism. 30 Given the powerful role of attorneys in the legal system-both practical and symbolic-their acts of noncompliance will almost certainly have a greater impact (for good and bad) than those of other citizens. Finally, the issue of lawyer civil disobedience potentially restricts the type of laws that can be justifiably disobeyed. Since there are some legal obligations imposed only on attorneys by virtue of their profession, 31 these rules may only be disobeyed by attorneys.
32
A determination that lawyer disobedience is prohibited would mean that these laws are not considered susceptible to noncompliance, a proposition that contradicts our society's general acceptance of the concept of civil disobedience. 42 and holds attorneys responsible for the law at all times, regardless of whether they are acting in their professional or personal capacities.
43
The Model Rules establish that it is AN ETHICAL STUDY 148-66 (1988) (discussing the dominant principle of nonaccountability of attorneys for the decisions of their clients). Such issues are related to, but distinct from, the question of whether attorneys may violate the law for moral reasons outside of their representational roles; these deserve separate attention.
Moreover, while important unresolved questions remain about representing clients considering conscientious lawbreaking, there appears already to be greater agreement in the legal community about the propriety of such representation than there is about actual attorney disobedience. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 6 (" [T] he fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does not of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action."); Newman, supra, at 290-92 (arguing that the professional codes of ethics clearly allow an attorney to give neutral legal advice to a client that will likely be used to commit a crime); Press Release, National Lawyers Guild, National Lawyers Guild Supports Acts of Civil Disobedience in Protesting Preemptive Strike Against Iraq (Oct. 3, 2002) Thus, the professional rules of ethics place on lawyers two sets of responsibilities that intersect and conflict on the question of conscientious lawbreaking. Civil disobedience is one potential mechanism by note 38, at 152 (noting that, under the Model Code, the ABA rejected "any distinction between professional and personal conduct, stating that a lawyer must comply with applicable rules at all times"); see also In re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1980) (rejecting attorney's contention that he should not be disciplined for illegal conduct because it "was unrelated to his professional skill and ability to practice law"). 44 seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession."); id. Preamble para. 7 ("A lawyer should strive . . . to improve the law and the legal profession . . . ."); id. R. 6.1(b)(3) (emphasizing that lawyers should participate "in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession").
which lawyers might seek to make the law-or the rules governing the legal profession-more just.
50
Yet, the rules appear to forbid such well-intended lawbreaking.
One possible solution to this conflict, identified in the Model Code, is simply to limit an attorney's efforts to improve the law to "lawful means." 51 This resolution is deficient in three respects. First, the Model Rules lack a similar restriction.
52 Second, the Model Code's limitation on attorney disobedience is in tension with its claim that "[e]ach lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions" are ethical.
53 Likewise, the Model Rules note that a lawyer's professional duties must be informed by "personal conscience," not merely the obligations imposed by the black letter words of the codes of ethics. 54 The spirit of such advice surely opens the door, however slightly, to attorney civil disobedience. Finally, attorneys may face circumstances in which lawful efforts to improve the law or prevent injustice are either ineffective or impossible. 55 Consider, for example, a case in which a client tells her lawyer that she committed the crime for which another person is about to be executed. 56 57 In essence, the lawyer had no "lawful" options at her disposal to ensure a just result. 58 In such instances, disobeying the law may be the most ethical course of action because it is the only way to prevent the legal system from committing a grave injustice. The "lawful reform" limitation fails to take such situations into account.
The case law offers little help in resolving this conflict or in clarifying what the consequences of conscientious noncompliance are under the codes of ethics. There are few instances on record in which practicing attorneys have committed civil disobedience and been subject to disciplinary proceedings. 59 Professor Monroe Freedman provides a personal account of what is perhaps the prototypical example of attorney civil disobedience. Freedman writes that he "openly violated the rules against advertising and solicitation, intentionally courting disciplinary action, because [he] believed that those rules deprived poor and unsophisticated people of essential information about their rights." 60 The District of Columbia Bar Association brought disciplinary charges against Professor Freedman, but eventually agreed with his position and issued "the first opinion anywhere approving advertising and solicitation of clients."
61 He notes that "[w]hen asked by 1636-37 (1996) (arguing that client confidentiality should be violated in the face of the loss of an innocent life). Perhaps the best known example of a life-or-death professional ethics problem occurred in Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) . Attorneys for a defendant in a personal injury suit involving a car accident discovered that the plaintiff had a potentially fatal aneurysm which may or may not have been caused by the accident. Id. at 707. It was clear that the plaintiff was unaware of the condition. Id. at 708. The defense attorneys completed settlement negotiations and never informed the plaintiff of the aneurysm, out of respect for their client's interests in the case. Id. 57 In 2002, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules was amended to permit breaches of client confidentiality in order "to prevent reasonably certain death." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1). The change in this Rule illustrates that the law governing attorneys, like other positive law, can and should evolve to accommodate overriding moral principles. 58 I assume that, in this situation, an attorney's "noisy withdrawal" would not have been helpful to the innocent defendant. See id. R. 1.16 cmt. 7 (noting that an attorney, in such situations, might be permitted to withdraw representation). 59 See Daly, supra note 34, at 1628 (noting that the author had "located no instances of civil disobedience directed to the judicial branch in its capacity as the regulator of the legal profession"); Griffin, supra note 50, at 1260 n.17 (admitting that the author did "not know how often civil disobedience ha[d] been invoked in disciplinary settings"). 60 Freedman, supra note 2, at 1137. 61 Id. Professor Freedman also writes that he engaged in civil disobedience several reporters and others how I, as a lawyer, could commit civil disobedience, I answered, 'I was a free person, with moral responsibility, before I was a lawyer. '" 62 Some lawyers have raised a civil disobedience defense to lawbreaking that courts found lacking in moral justification.
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Though such defenses were unsuccessful, the willingness of courts and disciplinary boards to consider them suggests that there may indeed be a role for conscientious disobedience in professional ethics cases. One state bar committee stated that "a single act of civil disobedience did not call into question an attorney's fitness to practice law," but that "frequent and/or continual misdemeanor convictions of this nature may result in more serious professional consequences."
64
The treatment of applicants for admission to the bar provides a fair-though imperfect-comparison of how the rules of ethics are interpreted with regard to civil disobedience.
65
The certification process is analogous to disciplinary proceedings in that state bars require applicants, like their members, to be of good moral character.
66
Criminal conduct in both contexts reflects on an attorney's moral fitness because it shows a lack of respect for the law. 67 The retimes to protest the Vietnam War, but does not mention whether disciplinary action resulted from these acts. The California Supreme Court, for example, held that an applicant's multiple arrests in the context of the civil rights movement did not disqualify him from the practice of law, noting that such noncompliance might be considered a product of "the highest moral courage."
69 By contrast, Illinois denied admission to a conscientious objector to World War II on the grounds that his pacifist views prevented him from complying with a state constitutional requirement that applicants serve in the state's militia during time of war.
70 Thus, while the treatment of bar applicants suggests that there is some tolerance of civil disobedience among the bars, the states differ too widely in this respect to draw any clear lessons.
Part of the difficulty in determining the consequences of civil disobedience under the rules of ethics is simply that the codes themselves, like nearly every other form of positive law, are subject to many reasonable interpretations. 71 To prohibit illegal conduct that involves "moral turpitude"
72 or "reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer" 73 invites the disciplinary boards to inject subjective values, including their own sense of morality, into bar admission due to illegal activities, "regardless of the likelihood of their repetition in a lawyer-client relationship," because they "would demean the profession's reputation"). The primary difference between disciplinary procedures and bar admission inquiries is that in the former, the bar bears the burden of showing the attorney's moral deficiency, while in the latter, applicants bear the burden of showing their own moral fitness. See Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 421 P.2d 76, 80 (Cal. 1966) (stating that applicants to the bar bear the burden of showing moral fitness, while the bar bears the burden of proving attorneys are unfit during disciplinary hearings); Rhode, supra note 65, at 547 (same 74 Others seem to suggest that one can fairly understand an attorney's professional obligation to permit civil disobedience. 75 Most acknowledge that the various rules contain ambiguities that allow for considerable "interpretive leeway" on the issue. 76 Without clear indications of the consequences of conscientious lawyer noncompliance in the codes of ethics, the case law, or the secondary literature, the most honest-and realistic-resolution to the issue is that the disciplinary prosecutors who enforce the rules currently retain enormous discretion as to how to treat civil disobedience. 77 Though perhaps intellectually unsatisfactory, this conclusion should hardly be surprising. We accept the propriety of prosecutorial 74 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 22, at 796 (claiming that under the Model Rules, "a lawyer who engages in conscientious disobedience to law is no better than a street criminal, and indeed may be worse if her conscientious disobedience arises from an ideology that is hostile to the American legal system"); Simon, supra note 45, at 424 (noting that there is "no tolerance . . . for civil disobedience" in the rules of professional ethics). 75 See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 2, at 597 (noting that a lawyer could theoretically "stand on the same footing as the nonlawyer" in committing civil disobedience LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994 , at 28 (noting that the wide discretion in disciplining prominent attorneys raises serious questions about whether the bar is willing or able to regulate attorneys at large firms, or whether its disciplinary power is directed only at "the occasional stray solo practitioner who pockets money from a client's escrow account"); Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?, FORBES, Aug. 12, 2002, at 58, 58 (noting that the bar's disciplinary authorities "would be absurdly outgunned" when attempting to discipline attorneys at large firms). This raises important questions about the bar's disciplinary process that are beyond the scope of this Comment. discretion in the criminal justice system as a check on unfair laws. 78 It is certainly possible that the dearth of case law in this area is influenced by prosecutors turning a blind eye to conscientious disobedience. And as Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes have noted, bar authorities undoubtedly approach attorney civil disobedience with sensitivity to the moral context of the lawbreaking. 79 In a self-regulated profession in which moral judgment and political independence are prized, 80 we should expect-and respect-such sensitivity.
Of course, it would be discomforting to any attorney contemplating civil disobedience that her professional fate is left to the discretion of a prosecutor with a moral compass potentially different from her own. Attorneys committing civil disobedience currently risk disciplinary actions that include temporary or permanent disbarment. 81 It is clear from this discussion that there is some tolerance, though perhaps only unspoken, of the role of civil disobedience by attorneys.
82
This may be cold comfort, however, given the stakes at play for lawyers.
III. REFUTING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ATTORNEY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Critics of attorney civil disobedience note that there is far more at stake when lawyers break the law than simply the consequences for an attorney's career. They argue that noncompliance by the bar has potentially much broader costs to the legal profession, to society, and to the law itself. In their minds, attorney civil disobedience is inappropriate in a legal system that is "generally just, even though not per- 78 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 23, at 226 ("Prosecutorial nullification is widely considered legitimate in circumstances where the application of a statute produces an especially harsh or anomalous result or where an entire statute, usually an old one, seems out of tune with contemporary sentiment . . . .").
79 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 32, § 9.20 (arguing that it is unlikely that bar authorities would discipline an attorney for violating the rules of ethics to save a life fect." 83 Thus, regardless of whether attorneys can commit civil disobedience under the ethics rules, it remains contested whether they should.
In this section, I will respond to the four major arguments against civil disobedience by analyzing the relationships among the legal profession, the law, and the public. When these relationships are properly understood, it becomes clear that none of these institutions would be threatened by an ethics regime that explicitly tolerated attorney civil disobedience.
A. Attorney Civil Disobedience and Respect for the "Rule of Law"
The first major objection to attorney disobedience is that it significantly weakens the law's normative power.
84
Because the law's authority depends in large part on the willingness of individuals in our society to accept and obey it, erosion of respect for the "rule of law" is a serious threat to our legal system. 85 Critics of attorney disobedience claim that attorney attitudes toward the law "rub off" on nonlawyers.
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Citizens take cues from attorneys when developing their own sense of obligation to respect the law. Attorneys who disobey the law-even conscientiously-convey to the lay public the potentially dangerous message that the law should be ignored when an individual deems it appropriate to do so.
Related to this claim is the concern that attorney disobedience has a second, more direct effect on the authority of our legal system. While it is deeply problematic for the average citizen not to feel particularly obligated to follow the law, it would be disastrous if the bar had the same lax attitude. to implement and interpret the laws. A legal system in which lawyers felt no particular commitment to the rule of law would be ineffective at enforcing social norms and likely unstable. Increasing tolerance for attorney civil disobedience might lead individual attorneys to become overly emboldened to make their own judgments about which laws deserve respect and which ones do not.
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This could greatly undermine the consistency and effectiveness of the legal system.
In short, critics charge that attorney lawbreaking "is likely to have larger negative consequences than similar actions" by nonlawyers.
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Civil disobedience may be acceptable for citizens, but legal ethics should not lightly tolerate lawyer noncompliance because it significantly undermines our society's respect for the legal system and the rule of law. Such arguments appear to mirror the reasoning of the provisions in the Model Rules and Model Code, which emphasize that "respect for the law should be more than a platitude" for attorneys.
90
Attorneys have a special relationship to the law that gives them a special responsibility to obey it.
Such claims certainly have some merit. One can vividly imagine the injustice of a legal system in which lawyers routinely violate the law themselves. Moreover, the actions of attorneys undoubtedly affect the attitude of others towards the law. Nevertheless, there are several counterarguments to this position-both theoretical and practicalthat significantly undermine its criticism of attorney civil disobedience.
Civil Disobedience Demonstrates
Respect for the Law
The first response to the claim that lawyer noncompliance weakens respect for the law is based on the very nature of civil disobedience. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, "an individual who breaks [a] law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law." 91 By submitting supra note 8, at 29 (noting the importance of judicial actors respecting the normative power of the law).
88 Cf. Luban, supra note 22, at 809 (arguing that lawyers may commit civil disobedience because they are "obligated to respect the law only when the law deserves respect"). oneself voluntarily to the legal system's judgment, one recognizes and affirms the law's authority and the legal obligations it imposes, even while protesting its morality. 92 This aspect of civil disobedience does not change simply because it is a lawyer who commits it.
Civil disobedience puts a choice to the authority figures it challenges: punish the lawbreaker and affirm the value of the rule; disassociate from the system because it is unjust; or acknowledge mistake in the rule and change it.
93 Far from weakening the law's authority, civil disobedience affords the state an opportunity to strengthen its normative power. In response to conscientious lawbreaking, the legal system reevaluates the rule that was violated, struggles with the moral issues it implicates, and strengthens the legal obligation imposed by affirming the law and punishing the lawbreaker. It is true that a judicial pronouncement radically out of line with a society's common morality may undermine the public's sense that the law in question is just and deserving of respect, but this is in no way exacerbated by the fact that the lawbreaker is an attorney.
92 See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 938-39 (describing the respect with which Gandhi submitted himself to the law's judgment as an important part of his philosophy). In contrast, David Luban has argued for what I believe is a more radical view of civil disobedience. He claims that citizens and lawyers are "obligated to respect the law only when the law deserves respect." Luban, supra note 22, at 809. "When the law is evil, unfair, or hopelessly stupid . . . the obligation [to obey it] vanishes and disobedience is in order." LUBAN, supra note 37, at 35. While such rhetoric is similar to that of traditional civil disobedience, it differs significantly by opening the door to the claim that immoral laws impose no legal obligation on citizens. Luban's position all but collapses the distinction between moral and legal obligation. See Luban, supra note 22, at 809 (suggesting that the "ground of [legal] obligation lies in some morally relevant property of laws").
This approach is much closer to the traditional natural law perspective-i.e., that an unjust law is not a valid law-than it is to my operative conception of civil disobedience, under which one recognizes a valid legal obligation that is simply trumped by a competing moral duty. See id. at 801-02 (arguing that the law implies a "utopian ideal" and acknowledging the similarity between his position and natural law); id. at 806 (stating that lawyers should consider the "natural-law legality" of a contested law when considering whether to take a case). The understanding of civil disobedience I have in mind here, however, is decidedly not based on natural law. By willingly accepting punishment from the legal system, a conscientious objector recognizes a law's legal validity and separates her moral obligations from her legal ones. Such a separation has a strong positivist flavor to it, in spite of the moral protest involved. See HART, supra note 13, at 210 (arguing that morally iniquitous laws may still be valid, but that the legal obligations they impose can be overcome by nonlegal, moral inquiry).
93 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 1137 (explaining how the author's civil disobedience forced the bar to change an ethics rule); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 932 (recounting Gandhi's statement that a judge must either inflict punishment on the lawbreaker or disassociate from the "evil" law at issue).
An example of the opportunity conscientious lawbreaking offers to strengthen legal obligation is provided by the case of Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore, who defied a federal injunction that ordered him to remove a monument of the Ten Commandments he had placed at the courthouse. 94 While there are unique aspects of Moore's case that distinguish it from the typical conscientious disobedience, 95 the matter is fairly comparable to attorney civil disobedience for the purposes of evaluating its effect on public respect for the law. In both cases, the defiance is public, based on a moral objection to the law, and committed by a judicial actor.
Chief Justice Moore's defiance provided the federal and state judiciaries with the opportunity to strengthen the rule of law. The federal judiciary affirmed the importance of the First Amendment's protection of separation of church and state, and the Alabama state judiciary reinforced the principle that "[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law."
96 Regardless of one's moral views about Moore's actions, the incident left no doubt as to his legal obligations under the First Amendment. As one might expect in a pluralistic society, Moore had strong supporters whose respect for the law and sense of duty to it was shaken by the incident. 97 particularly those who take their cues about the law's validity and worthiness from the judicial system itself, the lesson of Moore's defiance was that he violated a fundamental principle of our society and that the judicial system responded by disciplining him accordingly. The law functioned fairly and efficiently, dealing with Moore as it would have another lawbreaker without his considerable official stature. Surely this was a victory for the rule of law, not a defeat.
The Double Standard for Judging Attorney Civil Disobedience and Routine Legal Practices
There is something particularly hollow about the claim that attorney civil disobedience weakens respect for the law in light of many common practices that we expect and encourage in the name of "zealous representation."
98 As a matter of course in their daily work, lawyers seek to utilize the law to the advantage of their clients, often at the expense of the public good, a law's clear purpose, or the interest of justice.
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Attorneys exploit loopholes in the tax code, 100 structure transactions to avoid pesky regulations, 101 and argue for far-fetched constructions of the law to further client interests.
102
After the collapse of Enron, the public learned that it was "routine" (though per- 102 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (permitting attorneys to argue in favor of any construction of the law, without regard "to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail").
haps not legal) for lawyers to give advice that would have the effect of frustrating federal investigations. 103 A century ago, future Justice Louis Brandeis noted that it increasingly seemed to be the project of attorneys to "evade or nullify the extremely crude laws by which legislators sought to regulate the power or curb the excesses of corporations."
104
The messages sent by the legal profession through such representation are clear: a client's interest supercedes the public interest; the law is vulnerable to seemingly endless manipulation; even the clearest of legal duties is subject to debate. 105 The effect of such messages, conveyed to the public by nearly every aspect of the modern legal profession, is unquestionably significant to our society's attitude towards the law. Lawyers who stretch the fabric of the law to its breaking point while representing clients seek to reshape the applicability of a legal duty to fit their client's interests, which may overlap with the public good-but only coincidentally.
106 Such representation strips the law of its veneer of generality, the characteristic that is most critical to our society's internal sense of obligation to the law. 107 Such a pervasive attitude in the legal profession must weaken our society's respect for the rule of law at least as much as it is purportedly weakened by attorney civil disobedience, by which lawyers demonstrate their devotion to the 103 See Rhode & Paton, supra note 101, at 24 (describing the profession's reaction to the actions of Nancy Temple, the in-house Arthur Andersen attorney whose advice during the Enron affair eventually helped lead to the firm's downfall). 104 (2003) ("Law school teaches students to become tough-minded, hyper-rational, and insensitive to issues beyond the interests of their client-a perspective that undermines ethical decision-making.").
106 See Pepper, supra note 37, at 1554 (arguing that the legal profession's approach to the law "may lead the client to respect the law less"). 107 See LUBAN, supra note 37, at 48-49 ("[T] he principle of partisanship in the legal profession threatens to undermine the generality of law and thus to abrogate the moral authority of law. It is only its generality, its fairness, that elevates law from a coercive system to a system exerting moral-and not just physical-force.").
public interest and affirm the legal authority of the law by willingly accepting punishment.
Critics of lawyer civil disobedience seem to apply two sets of rules to attorney actions that affect respect for the law. They fear the effect of morally motivated noncompliance by attorneys, but defend a model of the profession that sacrifices respect for the generality of law to a client's interests. This apparent inconsistency is not merely a product of applying different standards to attorney actions taken while representing a client than to actions taken in one's individual capacity.
108 For example, in the context of criticizing attorney disobedience, Professor Timothy Terrell also condemns the development of a "duty-based" practice of law, which emphasizes society's interests over those of one's clients. 109 Terrell cites several examples of the trend toward duty-based lawyering that he finds particularly troubling, including recent strategies to hold attorneys accountable for their role in questionable transactions within the healthcare industry, as well as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirement that attorneys breach confidentiality to prevent securities fraud.
110
Whatever one thinks about the merit of these attempted reforms of the legal profession, it is clear that they were intended to rehabilitate our society's respect for and trust in the law after instances in which attorneys' advocacy for their clients seemed to go too far.
111
Thus, Terrell's criticism of these changes, juxtaposed with his fear that attorney civil disobedience will weaken respect for the law, 112 is perplexing.
I should not be misunderstood as taking a position directly on the question of whether it is proper for attorneys to engage in so-called "aggressive lawyering" in their clients' interests. There are strong arguments that keeping the interests of clients at the center of attorney advocacy helps the law to evolve and improve for the benefit of society. It is a model that protects a client's autonomy and provides a check on the power of the state. inconsistency of those who claim that attorney civil disobedience is flawed because it weakens respect for the law while simultaneously defending routine practices of lawyers that likely have a more adverse effect on the rule of law. Civil disobedience and aggressive lawyering implicate the same interests: improvement of the law and resistance to the state's potential for injustice. These goals either outweigh the need for attorneys to protect the public's respect for the law, or they do not. If they do, however, they should do so in both contexts.
The Inconsistent Position of the Organized Bar on Attorney Civil Disobedience
Past actions by the organized bar cast doubt on how seriously one should take its insistence in the Model Rules and Model Code that attorneys display an almost sacred respect for the law. 114 When it comes to the law governing lawyers, the bar has demonstrated far less respect for the law than one might assume based on its pronouncements in the codes of ethics. According to Professor Susan Koniak, the bar has "flouted and bypassed court attempts to articulate the law governing lawyers . . . [and] used its own power to insist on a law that diverges from the 'official' law articulated by the courts."
115
In so doing, the bar has suggested that respect for the state's law appropriately takes a back seat to other considerations in certain instances.
At various times in recent history, the bar has asserted its claim to self-regulation when threatened with increased government oversight.
116
On occasions when the government has regulated lawyers over the objections of the legal profession, the bar has directly resisted the new rules. When state courts began to require attorneys to violate traditional rules of client confidentiality to prevent fraud, the ABA-rather than accept and respect the determination of the judiciary-insisted that the profession was under no such obligation. 117 The bar's resisproposal to restrict the partisanship of lawyers when such partisanship violates common morality would severely interfere with client autonomy 121 the bar has supported attorney civil disobedience. Certainly this cannot, and should not, be taken as a general endorsement of noncompliance by the ABA. It should, however, give us some perspective about the consequences of lawyer disobedience on our society. In real-world applications of the ethics rules, even the organized bar has recognized that there are some extralegal principles that outweigh an attorney's legal duty and her professional responsibility to demonstrate respect for the law. While it is conceivable that the bar views the rule of client confidentiality as the only principle for which it is worth an attorney breaking the law, it is more reasonable to believe that there are competing moral precepts of greater worth for which civil disobedience is also justified. 122 with state courts over the issue of disclosure of confidential information). 118 Wilkins, supra note 86, at 276-77; see also Koniak, supra note 115, at 1102 ("Ethics opinions advising lawyers what to do when faced with state law that appears to require disclosure or some other infidelity to the client suggest that a lawyer is free to ignore the weight of court authority."). 
Isolated Acts of Attorney Civil Disobedience Do Not Threaten the Rule of Law
A final common-sense response to the claim that attorney civil disobedience will erode respect for the law is that any adverse impact on the rule of law from a lawyer's isolated act of noncompliance will be minor.
123 Any negative impact on the public would very likely remain localized for the simple reason that it would be rare for the disobedience to be publicized more widely.
124 Moreover, attorney civil disobedience is almost certain to remain relatively isolated. While nearly every lawyer recognizes flaws in the legal system, few lawyers question the law's legitimacy so deeply that they would resort to noncompliance on more than a rare occasion.
125 Evidence indicates that many attorneys hold views similar to those of their privileged clients-hardly the citizens from whom one expects widespread civil disobedience.
126
One survey reported that only about one in every six attorneys in large firms had ever refused an assignment or potential work solely because it violated her personal values.
127
Such empirical evidence about the attitudes of attorneys strongly suggests that a codified ethical acknowledgement that some moral obligations may trump an attorney's duty to respect the law will not open the floodgates to widespread attorney civil disobedience.
123 See Wilkins, supra note 100, at 511 ("An isolated act of lawyer nullification does not threaten the rule of law.").
124 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, 54 RUTGERS L. REV.
191, 212 n.85 (2001) ("Although lawyer 'misconduct' often is publicized in the press, the lawyer's notoriety typically is limited to the local jurisdiction. The systemic effects of the lawyer's conduct will probably be similarly confined."). There are, of course, exceptions to the general thesis that attorney civil disobedience receives only local attention. 503, 534-35 (1985) .
B. Attorney Civil Disobedience and Respect for Lawyers
The second major argument commonly offered against attorney civil disobedience is that it reduces the public's respect for the legal profession. Given that our society generally assumes all citizens have a duty to follow the law, attorney civil disobedience may reflect negatively on lawyers generally. The public may trust lawyers less, for fear that they have their own agenda and that their professional ethics are inadequate.
128
Nonlawyers may perceive attorney noncompliance to be symptomatic of a double standard in the legal profession, whereby lawyers, while ostensibly counseling others to obey the law, feel at liberty to disobey it themselves.
Reducing the public's trust in the legal profession has worrisome implications for client service, as well as for the legal system as a whole. Lawyers enjoy power and privileges that are contingent on maintaining the public's trust in the profession. A lawyer's ability to conceal information under attorney-client confidentiality that other citizens would be required to disclose is just one example of such a privilege. For the profession to continue justifying such special treatment, society must believe that attorneys are people of integrity.
129
In addition, as trust of lawyers erodes, the legal system becomes more unstable. Clients must depend on attorneys to honor their duty of zealous representation; 130 judges must rely on lawyers to act as upright "officers of the court" who will play fair while serving their clients. The judicial process depends on the trust that all sides place in attorneys to uphold their duties. Thus, the charge that lawyer civil disobedience weakens respect for the legal profession is a serious concern.
As an initial matter, it should be noted that our society hardly seems to hold lawyers in high esteem today. A brief survey of the 128 See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 211-13 (describing the potential impact of attorney defiance on the public's perception of the legal profession).
129 See France, supra note 99, at 70 (relating the character requirements for attorneys to their extensive power in the legal system). In addition, Professor Timothy Terrell has argued that "[i]f and only if the rule of law has a normative foundation does the 'role' a lawyer plays as a professional have any moral standing." Terrell, supra note 28, at 834. Thus, by undermining the public's sense of duty to obey the law through their acts of civil disobedience, Terrell believes that attorneys weaken the very aspect of the law that gives them their unique power in the legal system. 130 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
genre of "lawyer jokes" provides a fairly strong indication of this fact.
131
Consider just a small sampling:
Question: Why did the research scientist substitute lawyers for rats in his laboratory experiments?
Answer: Lawyers breed more rapidly, scientists became less attached to them, and there are some things that rats just won't do.
Q[uestion]
: What is the difference between a catfish and a lawyer?
One is a disgusting, bottom-feeding scavenger, and the other is just a fish.
133
More methodically gathered evidence confirms that the public has a negative view of lawyers. In a recent public opinion poll, eighteen percent of respondents believed that attorneys had high ethical standards. Lawyers were positioned near the bottom of professions in this category, ranking above the likes of car salesmen and advertising practitioners but below Congressmen. 134 In another survey, only about one in every four people said they trusted lawyers to tell the truth, positioning them nineteenth out of the twenty professions considered.
135
While negative social views of the legal profession are hardly novel, 136 the recent highly publicized corporate scandals have further tarnished the image of attorneys.
137
Lawyers played key roles in the Enron, Tyco, and Global Crossing affairs. 138 As legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers has noted, whereas lawyers would ideally serve as "brakes on bad conduct," the reality is that "client pressures have turned [lawyers] into more of a gas pedal." 139 One might argue that the prevalence of such bleak views about attorneys lends support to the claim that lawyer civil disobedience would be harmful to the profession. If the bar is on the brink of losing the public's confidence altogether, the last thing we want is the public to see attorneys flouting the authority of the law. This conclusion is flawed. It overlooks the reasons for the bar's scarred image and, consequently, misunderstands the effect of civil disobedience on the profession.
Evidence suggests that the two ideas that most contribute to the negative view of attorneys are the impression that they are moneyhungry and the belief that they "manipulate the legal system without any concern for right or wrong."
140 The common perception is that today's lawyer "all too often strives only to be 'aggressive' . . . not in the pursuit of justice but only in the prurient, self-serving interests of his or her own clients."
141 It is hard to imagine how publicity of a lawyer taking a deeply held moral stand, while willingly accepting the legal system's punishment, would add to these negative images of the profession. On the contrary, such actions display the characteristics that the public seems to believe are lacking among lawyers: selfsacrifice, concern for the public interest, and recognition of the rule of law.
It is significant that among our culture's most revered images of lawyers are those who protect justice over rigid and impersonal rules and preserve moral integrity over personal interests. Atticus Finch, perhaps the most dignified lawyer in our shared cultural memory, agrees at the conclusion of To Kill a Mockingbird to lie to the town about the circumstances of Bob Ewell's death-that is, to obstruct jus-139 Mike France, What About the Lawyers?, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58, 59 (quoting Professor Gillers's discussion of whether the SEC's new regulations on lawyers go far enough), available at http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/02_51/ b3813093.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2004) . 140 Post, supra note 132, at 380 (noting that 32% of respondents to a 1986 National Law Journal poll thought that the most negative aspect of lawyers was their interest in money, and 22% believed it was their exploitation of the legal system); see also Such characters have in common an element of rebelliousness, generally revealed by their willingness to bend or break the strict edicts of the law to arrive at the just result. If popularity is any indication, their defiance of the law seems to have earned such attorneys our admiration, not condemnation.
145
Of course, life is not a movie, and I do not argue based on fictional works that attorney civil disobedience would actually improve the public's respect for the legal profession. I merely claim that it is highly unlikely that our society would condemn lawyers who commit civil disobedience because they display precisely the virtues that the public seems to want the bar to internalize. We must recognize that, to some extent, the legal profession is in a no-win situation when it comes to public respect. In an adversarial legal system, in which individuals rely on lawyers to protect their rights, attorneys are both loved and reviled for the very same thing: strong advocacy of their client's interests. 146 We hate the fact that, in the words of Vito Corleone, " [l] awyers can steal more money with a briefcase than a thousand men with guns and masks," 147 but find it far less troubling when they are "stealing" on our behalf. Attorney civil disobedience would not affect this dynamic one way or another because it appeals to the best view of lawyers as protectors of justice and virtue, especially when it comes 142 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 274-79 (1960) clients' wishes and bending the rules to satisfy those wishes; and they are at the very same time condemned for . . . using the legal system to get what their clients want, rather than to uphold the right and denounce the wrong."). 147 MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER 220 (1969) .
outside of the client context. Some official tolerance for lawyer noncompliance might not improve the public's respect for the profession, but it would not weaken it either.
C. Attorney Civil Disobedience and the Bar's Voluntary Promissory Obligation
The third argument against attorney civil disobedience is that lawyers have voluntarily agreed to obey the law by choosing their profession and agreeing to its ethical norms.
148
This contractarian perspective of a lawyer's duty to the law holds that, even though other citizens have a right to commit civil disobedience, attorneys have a heightened duty to obey the law by virtue of their conscious decision to become lawyers.
149
When attorneys promise to uphold and obey the law, they impose on themselves an additional moral duty that is distinct from every citizen's obligation to uphold the rules of the state. In essence, this argument claims that attorneys freely forsake the option of future civil disobedience the moment they take their oaths for the bar.
The emphasis on the legal profession's promissory obligation to obey the law is inimical to the traditional concept of an independent bar capable of making free moral and political judgments. 150 The Supreme Court noted more than forty-five years ago that a "bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal."
151 The freedom to judge, criticize, and resist the state's authority is not taken from lawyers by their choice of profession.
152
148 See Wilkins, supra note 86, at 290 ("[U]nlike ordinary citizens, lawyers have expressly promised to obey the law. . . . By expressly undertaking this commitment, lawyers have entered into a voluntary agreement with society that, like any other promise, has independent moral weight."); see also McMorrow, supra note 38, at 142 (noting that state bars "may compel a bar applicant to take an oath of office," which likely includes a promise to uphold the law future injustice. Lawyers must make moral judgments about the law as it changes, not as it was when they agreed to uphold it in their oath. Professor Freedman notes that an attorney remains "a free person, with moral responsibility," despite taking the oath for admission to the bar.
158 Attorneys unavoidably assume a measure of moral responsibility for the substantive outcomes of the law because they "exercise quasi-legislative power in deciding whether a given legal command applies to a particular case."
159 Given this responsibility, it is reasonable to expect that the concept of attorney independence would also give attorneys some autonomy over the decision to resist an unjust law. 160 Civil disobedience is an accepted form of protest by other citizens and a critical tool for attorneys to prevent injustice that is not removed by an oath. 161 The voluntary decision to join the bar cannot alone strip lawyers of this freedom.
D. Attorney Civil Disobedience and the Bar's Privileged Position
The final argument against attorney civil disobedience is based on the fact that lawyers enjoy far more power within the legal system than other citizens. Some critics of lawyer noncompliance claim that the additional opportunities attorneys have to initiate reform lawfully make their civil disobedience unjustified.
162
Actions that might be defensible if taken by a nonlawyer are inappropriate for lawyers, who have far greater legal options at their disposal. 163 Other commentators argue that the power attorneys have within the 158 Freedman, supra note 2, at 1138; cf. THOREAU, supra note 18, at 243 (arguing that even a just government authorized by "the sanction and consent of the governed" had "no pure right over [his] person"). 159 Wilkins, supra note 100, at 514. 160 See id. (arguing that lawyers must have the "right to reject the formal requirements of rules and roles in situations when following the official path would produce substantively bad results"). 161 See supra notes 2, 27 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition that civil disobedience is an accepted form of protest). 162 See Cowen, supra note 2, at 597 (arguing that attorney civil disobedience is rarely justified since lawyers have "a greater opportunity than does the layman to rectify allegedly unjust or immoral laws within the existing legal structure"). 163 This argument presupposes that the validity of civil disobedience depends, in part, on the unavailability of other forms of protest. Others contend that such an assumption is unnecessarily restrictive on civil disobedience. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 22, at 801 (stating that one's duty to obey the law turns solely on whether the laws are worthy of respect).
legal system comes with the legitimate expectation that attorneys will exercise it.
164
Attorneys alone may pull the levers of legal reform, established as a form of democratic protection of citizens. 165 Thus, when lawyers choose to break the law in protest instead of utilizing the legal options available, they betray their role in our democracy.
166
There are two responses to this objection. First, a lawyer's power comes hand-in-hand with insight into the legal system that other citizens lack. In addition to giving attorneys a privileged position, a lawyer's professional role provides her with unique opportunities to see the law operate wrongly or unfairly. Attorneys have a better sense of which laws create the greatest injustices and which may actually be improved through noncompliance. Moreover, an attorney's role differs from that of nonlawyers in that they are charged as guardians of the administration of justice. 167 These differences between members of the legal profession and other citizens may actually make "a lawyer . . . particularly well equipped to break or disregard the law as an act of civil disobedience." 168 In addition, it is possible to exaggerate the power attorneys have within the legal system. We have already seen the ways in which this power is limited.
169
Even for attorneys, lawful reform of unjust laws 164 See Wilkins, supra note 86, at 274 ("Lawyers are more than ordinary citizens; they have been given a monopoly by the state to occupy a position of trust both with respect to the interests of their clients and the public purposes of the legal framework."). 165 See id. (describing the role of lawyers as monopolistic and noting that this role is tied to the social good). 166 Not everyone agrees that lawyers should be regarded as playing a unique role A lawyer may be the only individual who can protest the law, and civil disobedience may be the only way to lodge such protests. Thus, the power of attorneys alone should not prevent us from explicitly tolerating their civil disobedience.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR OFFICIAL TREATMENT OF ATTORNEY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The current rules of legal ethics overdeter attorney civil disobedience due to the simple fact that they do not address it directly. Attorneys are left with little guidance from the organized bar about which principles, if any, constitute a moral justification for violating the law. Moreover, the ethics rules are of little help in determining the professional consequences of disobedience.
171
With so much uncertainty about civil disobedience in the law governing lawyers, committing it remains a high stakes gamble. As demonstrated in Part III, the justifications for excluding a more forthright discussion of conscientious noncompliance in the Model Code and Model Rules are weak. Recognizing the option of attorney civil disobedience will not threaten the public's respect for the law, the legal system, or the legal profession.
Even the critics of attorney civil disobedience agree that there are some instances in which it is unreasonable to impose on lawyers a categorical duty to obey the law. The case of Nazi Germany presents a moral baseline at which these commentators concur that noncompliance is justified. 172 The more complicated issue is how to define a lawyer's duty to obey the law in legal regimes, such as ours, that are "generally just." 173 In this section, I will propose amendments to the Model Rules to better identify and accommodate instances of justified civil disobedience in the context of the American legal system. 170 See Minow, supra note 37, at 727-39 (describing the limits on lawful reform, the potential negative consequences in pursuing it, and the advantages that civil disobedience offers in certain situations).
171 See supra Part II (discussing the uncertain treatment in the legal ethics rules and case law of attorney civil disobedience 
A. Defining Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience should be incorporated into the Model Rules as a defense to mitigate the effects of the charge that an attorney has violated her legal duties.
174
To recognize such a defense in the codes, we must define what constitutes civil disobedience. This task 174 The difficulty of identifying attorney civil disobedience in some cases is illustrated by the recent development of multidisciplinary practices (MDPs). The most prominent types of MDPs are those which offer business consulting, financial planning, and legal services to their clients all at once by "partnering . . . lawyers and nonlawyers in multi-task service firms." Jeffrey M. 'L L. & BUS. 235, 252-53 (2001) (criticizing the claim that lawyers at MDPs are engaging in civil disobedience as a "doomsday prediction" that inaccurately depicts a crisis in the legal profession). The MDPs themselves, as they interpret the rules of ethics, argue that they have not violated them, conscientiously or otherwise. See Fox, Accountants Are Hawks, supra, at 1100 (reciting the MDP argument that their lawyers are not subject to the rules of professional ethics because they are not practicing law).
No one-especially not the bar-seems to know quite how to handle the MDPs. Their practices represent a significant and intentional departure from current professional norms, but enforcement of the ethics provisions supposedly violated by MDPs has remained lax, and MDPs vigorously fought the few enforcement proceedings brought against them. See Jones, supra, at 425-26 (remarking that there is "very little in the way of enforcement [of the disciplinary rules] to show" for all the concern about MDPs, and reporting that an enforcement action against an MDP failed because the MDP "simply overwhelmed the bar with a phalanx of defense lawyers" (quoting Krysten Crawford, The Enemy Has Landed, and They Count Beans, AM. LAW., Dec. 1998, at 16)).
is more difficult than it would first seem. There is a wide range of attorney behavior that falls within the "gray areas" of positive law, with the result being that there are times when it may be difficult to pin down which actions constitute actual noncompliance. This is especially true when the alleged wrongdoer refuses to acknowledge her offense.
A definition of civil disobedience in the ethics rules should include four elements. First, the act constituting civil disobedience must be public. An attorney's actions should only fall within the definition if she acknowledges that she has broken the law and offers civil disobedience as a defense. Though there may be instances in which nonpublic lawbreaking is more effective for ensuring a just result, such behavior does not demonstrate the respect for the law that redeems an attorney's defiance and gives the system an opportunity to respond.
175 Moreover, if a nonpublic violation were to become public, it would undermine trust in the legal profession much more than if it had been public from the beginning.
176
Second, the disobedience must be nonviolent. A civil disobedience defense cannot be a safe harbor for violence. Noncompliance with unjust laws loses its legitimacy when it is violent. 177 Third, the attorney must offer an explanation of her defiance based on moral or religious conviction.
178 David Luban has persuasively argued that the obligation to obey the law can be understood, in part, as an obligation to our fellow citizens.
179
When attorneys (and other citizens) seek to convince the legal system that violating this obligation was justified, they owe their fellow citizens an explanation of why they believed the law was "wrong, stupid, or unfair." 180 Though identifying when an attorney's moral or religious beliefs actually compel her to violate the law is a delicate matter, the jurisprudence regarding conscientious objectors to military service provides a helpful comparison. Citizens have been relieved from their military duty on grounds of ethical standards that had a "functional role in 175 See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 214-16 (discussing the problems caused by secret conscientious objection by attorneys guiding the objector's behavior throughout his everyday activities," when these beliefs were held extremely deeply, and when the objector demonstrated his strength of convictions by accepting punishment. 181 These standards provide the bar with a touchstone by which to judge whether an attorney's asserted moral commitments are genuine.
Finally, civil disobedience should exclude activities motivated primarily by material self-interest. 182 An attorney who cannot establish this element is unlikely to succeed in establishing the previous one either. Explicitly stating this requirement, however, emphasizes-to the legal profession and to the public-the features of self-sacrifice and concern for the public interest that are central to civil disobedience.
B. Limiting Disciplinary Discretion
Commentators disagree on how much discretion should be afforded to disciplinary bodies in punishing attorneys who engage in civil disobedience. Generally, those scholars who wish to restrict discretion in punishing defiant attorneys are those who are also skeptical of the propriety of attorney civil disobedience.
183 I believe, however, that a call for constrained discretion in the bar's disciplinary system is an important element of making the legal profession more tolerant of lawyer noncompliance.
There are two ways in which disciplinary discretion should be limited. First, I propose to limit the range of professional consequences that attorneys currently face for civil disobedience. The ethics rules currently provide no hint of the consequences of conscientious noncompliance. Rather, attorneys are left to gamble on the response of the bar's disciplinary authorities, with little help in determining whether their disobedience will be ignored, result in a slap on the wrist, or cost them their licenses.
184 Without a clear picture of the risk to their careers, attorneys cannot make an informed evaluation of whether they should conscientiously violate a law. Establishing a more 181 See Zacharias, supra note 124, at 202-05 (discussing legal standards for granting conscientious objector status).
182 Cf. Luban, supra note 28, at 259 n.34 (suggesting that civil disobedience should exclude actions taken by a lawyer for "intended pecuniary gain"). 183 See, e.g., Terrell, supra note 28, at 831-34 (opposing increased discretion in interpreting the rules and criticizing attorney civil disobedience in a "generally just" legal system). 184 See supra text accompanying note 77 (describing the uncertainty about the bar's response to civil disobedience).
limited range of punishment within the ethics rules for disciplining civil disobedience will allow lawyers to consider noncompliance more thoughtfully. Because of a lawyer's heightened duty to obey the law, some professional disciplinary consequences are appropriate for attorneys who commit civil disobedience. 185 But at the same time, the professional penalty to attorneys cannot be so great that their very ability to practice law may be at stake, as it currently is.
186 Attorneys should be subject, at the very worst, to no more than a temporary suspension of their ability to practice.
I also propose to limit the ability of disciplinary counsel to turn a blind eye to attorney civil disobedience. 187 As Professor Bruce Green has observed, the attitude of disciplinary counsel towards conscientious lawbreaking is often that lawyers should go ahead and do it, but "[j]ust don't tell us about it."
188 This form of prosecutorial discretion undermines the justifications for and effectiveness of attorney civil disobedience in several ways. First, the exercise of such discretion strips civil disobedience of its value as a tool for improving the law. By giving a defiant attorney a pass, the bar minimizes the law-morality conflict that the lawyer's disobedience highlights. This robs both the bar and the legal system of an opportunity to publicly evaluate the attorney's criticism and to adequately consider the most appropriate response. Second, attorneys who have committed civil disobedience show their respect for the law by accepting punishment. If lawyers face no disciplinary proceedings for their violations, this element of respect is not displayed to the public. This potentially undermines the public's respect for the law and for the legal profession.
189
Finally, prosecutorial discretion detracts from the generality of the ethics rules and weakens their moral authority.
190 This is contrary to the purpose of civil disobedience, which is to strengthen legal authority, not to undermine it. 185 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing a lawyer's increased responsibility to obey the law).
186 See Terrell, supra note 28, at 835-36 (noting that disbarment is a potential consequence of civil disobedience). 187 Compare id. at 840 (arguing against increasing discretion within legal ethics to accommodate civil disobedience), with Strassberg, supra note 23, at 951-52 (supporting increased prosecutorial discretion for justified noncompliance). 188 Green, supra note 77, at 1308 (quoting an unidentified disciplinary counsel). 189 See supra Part III.A-B (discussing how attorneys show respect for the law by accepting punishment willingly). 190 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting that the fairness and generality of the law is the feature that earns it our respect).
